the norm.
1 Since World War II, they have led to far more deaths and destruction than international wars and have a mixed record of attaining a sustainable peace.
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What is possibly most surprising is the number of voluntary mergers that go sour. At the international level, Egypt and Syria formed the United Arab Republic in 1958, only to see it dissolve in acrimony three years later. In business, voluntary 'mergers of equals' are frequent, but in reality they hardly ever turn out that way. For example, while DaimlerChrysler and Citigroup started out as such mergers, one of the principals in each quickly became the dominant figure and ousted its former partner.
To try to understand the difficulties of power sharing, we begin with Model I (section 2), in which two players agree, initially, on how they will share the assets of their merged enterprise. Either player may then choose to break the agreement by 'shooting' at its erstwhile partner -now its opponent -as in a duel. If this shot hits its mark, which we assume occurs with a specific probability, the shooter eliminates its opponent and acquires all the assets. If neither player is eliminated, the original sharing agreement stays in place.
Each player must worry that its opponent will fire first. Even if it is not rational for, say, player P to fire first, we show that it will be rational for player Q to do so. But anticipating a shot by Q, which may or may not be successful, P, in turn, can do better by getting in the first shot.
This result is extremely robust -it does not depend on the sharing agreement or the probability of success of either player. We show that neither player will be deterred from shooting, however large its initial share of the assets, and however small its probability of eliminating its opponent.
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This is true even with the discounting of future payoffs in a multiperiod
